A fast-moving web supply-chain attack dubbed OPTIMJACK compromised trusted third-party JavaScript snippets hosted by digital experience platform Optimizely on Monday, November 16, exposing visitors across at least 178 global organizations—including the BBC, CNN, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, and Ledger—to payment card skimming, cryptocurrency address hijacking, and iOS exploit kits.
While none of the 178 downstream organizations suffered direct breaches of their internal servers, threat actors abused a vulnerability in Optimizely's platform to inject malicious code directly into customer Project JavaScript configurations. Because those tampered scripts were served directly from Optimizely's legitimate Content Delivery Network (CDN) under a valid certificate, standard domain-level allowlisting failed to stop the delivery.
According to telemetry published by cybersecurity researcher Scott Helme at Report URI, along with parallel analyses from StepSecurity and Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, the campaign unfolded rapidly across UTC hours on Monday.
02:21 UTC (Nov. 16): Report URI captures a clean baseline of the BBC's Optimizely snippet.
04:21 UTC (Nov. 16): Researchers detect the first injected malicious payload live on bbc.com.
04:21 – 20:40 UTC: Over roughly 16 hours, the threat actor actively modifies and rebuilds the payload 26 times, adding new monetization features, evasion wrappers—including Base64 atob() encoding and inline eval() fallbacks—and destination wallets without removing previous ones. Across 1,611 examined Optimizely files, researchers confirm 188 infected snippets spanning 178 organizations—including www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com themselves.
13:43 UTC (Nov. 16): The attacker pushes a major update adding real-time payment card skimming to the active payload.
20:40 – 23:11 UTC (Nov. 16): Optimizely patches the underlying vulnerability and executes a mass cleanup across affected customer projects. By 23:11 UTC, all monitored snippets are verified clean, though Optimizely finalized account-level remediation early Tuesday morning.
"The important lesson here is that trusted JavaScript doesn't always remain trustworthy," said Scott Helme, Founder of Report URI. "A website can be compromised through a third-party dependency without its own code or infrastructure ever being breached."
Unlike single-purpose skimmers, OPTIMJACK dynamically profiled visitors' browsers, devices, and on-page behavior to deploy four distinct malicious routines.
Multi-chain cryptocurrency clipping: The script scanned DOM elements, form fields, clipboard events (navigator.clipboard), outgoing fetch/XHR requests, and the iOS share sheet for valid checksummed wallet addresses across Bitcoin, Ethereum/EVM chains, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, and Dogecoin, silently swapping them for attacker-controlled addresses. Blockchain tracing showed roughly $6,600 to $7,040 swept from victim transactions within nine hours before the attacker's primary payload domain (1688360.cc) was suspended.
Checkout form card skimming: Added mid-campaign, the skimmer monitored form submissions and XHR/fetch POST traffic for Luhn-valid payment card numbers, expiration dates, and CVVs, exfiltrating the data via navigator.sendBeacon. While payment data entered inside isolated third-party iframes (such as Stripe or Adyen) remained out of reach, cards typed directly into native site checkout forms were exposed.
Session cookie and DOM screenshot theft: Whenever the script triggered near payment or wallet terminology, it captured document.cookie values (targeting session tokens lacking the HttpOnly flag) alongside full-page screenshots rendered via html2canvas.
Mobile exploitation (Coruna and DarkSword): When detecting an iPhone or iPad, the script loaded secondary staging files (boot.js from .icu domains) to fingerprint the iOS version and launch hidden iframe exploit chains—delivering Coruna to devices on iOS 13–17 and DarkSword to devices on iOS 18.x (prior to patched builds iOS 18.7.3 and iOS 26.3).
A post-incident crawl of the 178 affected organizations by Report URI highlighted a persistent blind spot in client-side web security: Content Security Policy (CSP) configuration.
15% (24 organizations) had a CSP strict enough to block the unauthorized outbound data exfiltration or secondary script loads.
68 organizations had no Content Security Policy deployed at all.
50 organizations had permissive CSP rules that allowed the malicious script to execute and exfiltrate stolen data unimpeded.
Because enterprises routinely grant broad script-execution trust to marketing, analytics, and A/B testing vendors—and because Subresource Integrity (SRI) hashes are rarely practical for dynamically updated A/B testing snippets—compromises at the vendor control plane immediately inherit the full privileges of the host page.
"The Optimizely incident is a revealing manifest to supply-chain attacks. It's about the quiet bargain the modern web runs on millions of sites injecting a third-party script into every page load, and we've all agreed to trust it sight unseen," said VJ Viswanathan, CEO at TORQE and Founding Partner at CYFORIX, a research-driven strategic risk advisory and technology engineering firm.
"For roughly 17 hours, that bargain broke, and it broke at scale. More than 180 organizations got hit through one vendor: banking, credit, retail, aviation, streaming, software, news. No industry segment dodged this, because virtually every industry bolts third-party scripts onto the pages they serve, be it search engine or content delivery optimization."
"The adversaries didn't breach CNN's servers or HSBC's network; they didn't need to. They wrote malicious JavaScript into a platform all these brands trusted, and the brands did the delivery themselves: legitimate domain, valid certificates, inside their own trust boundary. A compromised bank gets your money; a compromised CNN gets your trust—and trust is exactly what a card skimmer or an iPhone exploit kit needs to work. Every marketing tag on your site is a supply-chain dependency," Viswanathan concluded.
Security teams whose organizations utilize Optimizely Web—or any third-party tag manager and experimentation framework—should take immediate verification steps.
Audit vendor project logs: Review Optimizely project change logs and audit trails between 02:00 UTC on November 16 and 02:00 UTC on November 17 for unauthorized modifications to Project JavaScript.
Hunt for indicators of compromise (IoCs): Query web proxy, DNS, and client-side telemetry logs for outbound requests to 1688360[.]cc, 5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icu, eil786npto9u5bq[.]icu, and webshell[.]lol.
Isolate payment flows: Ensure third-party marketing, analytics, and A/B testing scripts are strictly excluded from checkout, authentication, and account-recovery pages, and enforce hosted payment iframes where possible.
Harden session cookies and CSPs: Enforce HttpOnly and Secure flags on all sensitive session cookies so client-side JavaScript cannot read them via document.cookie, and tighten connect-src and script-src CSP directives rather than relying solely on vendor domain allowlisting.
Advise impacted end-users: If checkout pages were exposed during the November 16 window, notify potentially affected customers to monitor card statements and ensure iOS devices are updated to iOS 18.7.3 or iOS 26.3 or later.